Makes

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

        

 Basics 5/5

  • Identification

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    A DevSecOps framework powered by Nix.

  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na "bus factor" ya 2 au zaidi. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The project is maintained by Fluid Attacks and employes contribute to it as part of of their work schedule. Usually more than 2 developers contribute to each release: https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/commits/main and currently we have three persons in the payroll with maintainer status: https://fluidattacks.github.io/makes/governance/



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na angalau wachangiaji wawili wasiohusika. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    As of 2022-09-22, the project has had code contributions (measured in commits) from the following individuals:

    makes $ git log --format=%aN --since=2021-09-22 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

    152 Kevin Amado
    109 John Perez
     49 Daniel Salazar
     15 Diego Restrepo
      6 David Arnold
      3 Luis Saavedra
      2 GuangTao Zhang
      1 Timothy DeHerrera
      1 Github Dependabot
      1 Daniel Murcia
    

    https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/commits/main


  • Other


    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    We use https://reuse.software/ and validate its compliance in the CI/CD on each pull request. This is how a file copyright statement looks like: https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/blob/cf3762cd96b65759d9c18a9b30f41d5aac465f2c/README.md?plain=1#L1-L5


 Change Control 4/4

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.



    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    2FA is required at the organization level, so in order to sign-in to GitHub and approve pull requests or access the repository configuration they need to authenticate first.



    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    GitHub normally uses a token based 2FA read from a mobile authentication app, lately, the 2FA authentication is usually push-based, so a user needs to use GitHub mobile to enter the code display in the screen.


 Quality 7/7

  • Coding standards


    Mradi LAZIMA uandike mahitaji yake ya kukagua msimbo, pamoja na jinsi ukaguzi wa nambari unafanywa, nini lazima ichunguzwe, na nini kinachohitajika ili ikubalike. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]
  • Working build system


    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    We use the Makes, which uses the Nix Package Manager under the hood. The Nix Package Manager is a reproducible build tool. Generally all that is needed is a single command and that would build anything available in the repository.

    The build scripts and their Nix environment definition can be found here: https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/tree/8aeed32054e90ef6dd577a935b35d884a238dcde/makes


  • Automated test suite


    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    We have to test many programing languages, so in order to simplify orchestration we use a build tool. Usually all a person needs to do to invoke the test suite is to: - Open a pull request, which fires automated tests automatically, or - Run locally $ m . /test<something>, for example: $ m . /tests/secretsForGpgFromEnv

    https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/blob/a4b0e3ba6c309972354852efb16bca00d0d97153/.github/workflows/dev.yml#L597



    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    Workflows are defined, running on GitHub actions https://github.com/fluidattacks/makes/tree/main/.github/workflows



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    Most of the code we have (the framework) uses Nix and Shell scripting, and there is no tool to measure their coverage. For our CLI application (which uses Python), we use Pytest and Pytest-Cov, to measure statement coverage, and is executed continuously by the CI/CD system on every Pull Request. However, we also have a lot of integration tests for the Nix+Shell components, so their correctness is verified as well.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    Most of the code we have (the framework) uses Nix and Shell scripting, and there is no tool to measure their coverage. For our CLI application (which uses Python), we use Pytest and Pytest-Cov, to measure branch coverage, and is executed continuously by the CI/CD system on every Pull Request. However, we also have a lot of integration tests for the Nix+Shell components, so their correctness is verified as well.


 Security 5/5

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]


    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

  • Other security issues


    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    We perform security reviews on each pull request. From a conceptual and design level, the potential problems and their mitigation (threat model) have been identified here: https://fluidattacks.github.io/makes/security/threat-model/. We also make sure that the design principles are secure: https://fluidattacks.github.io/makes/security/design-principles/. Static analysis tools are used often as well: https://fluidattacks.github.io/makes/security/assurance/



    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The Makes CLI is a Python application, there is no hardening we can do beyond making sure it runs with a recent version of Python and with dependencies free of known security vulnerabilities: https://fluidattacks.github.io/makes/security/assurance/


 Analysis 2/2

  • Dynamic code analysis


    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    We use an automated test suite for this purpose, branch coverage is enabled on it, and the critical flows are tested and verified by the CI/CD system for every change made in the project



    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    We use raise SystemExit(code) anytime an error condition is encountered so that the CLI signals to the user that something went wrong. An error message is also normally printed. This system exits would also be caught by the dynamic analysis tool.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit John Perez and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: John Perez.
Entry created on 2022-03-10 18:51:06 UTC, last updated on 2022-10-28 18:29:34 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2022-03-10 19:49:27 UTC.

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